CRT being sued in the High Court for misuse of Section 8 rule

[Cheshire cat]

I think it is the cheapest way to be seen to be "doing some of the right things"

[Arthur Marshall]

 

 

I would say that that is quite close to the truth in many instances Arthur. Not the emotionally based driving force that the British public should expect from those granted authority over them.

Of course, for so long as the majority of vocal customers applaud such responses, they will continue. They are not effective in maintaining and improving use of the system for the benefit of all, but they serve to placate the atavistic urge for retaliation against those perceived to be getting something more than oneself can get.

 

I'm not sure that it is really just the retaliation urge. I think that most of us just assumed that BW and then CRT were essentially benevolent and their actions were lawful (and therefore those being penalised were by definition in the wrong). Generally, their existence doesn't affect most of us much - and neither, in fact, does that of the relatively few boaters who flout the rules. It's hard (and usually time-consuming, emotionally draining and expensive) to call large organisations to account and without the bolshie few it wouldn't happen. Also, prior to the net and mobile comms, such information was simply not widely available.

[NigelMoore]

Yes indeed - it is that pesky education of the masses . . .

[Sir Nibble]

I'm not sure that it is really just the retaliation urge. I think that most of us just assumed that BW and then CRT were essentially benevolent and their actions were lawful (and therefore those being penalised were by definition in the wrong). Generally, their existence doesn't affect most of us much - and neither, in fact, does that of the relatively few boaters who flout the rules. It's hard (and usually time-consuming, emotionally draining and expensive) to call large organisations to account and without the bolshie few it wouldn't happen. Also, prior to the net and mobile comms, such information was simply not widely available.

Excellent point. This is a shining example of the empowerment envisaged when the internet began.

[pearlygeoff]

I'm not sure that it is really just the retaliation urge. I think that most of us just assumed that BW and then CRT were essentially benevolent and their actions were lawful (and therefore those being penalised were by definition in the wrong). Generally, their existence doesn't affect most of us much - and neither, in fact, does that of the relatively few boaters who flout the rules. It's hard (and usually time-consuming, emotionally draining and expensive) to call large organisations to account and without the bolshie few it wouldn't happen. Also, prior to the net and mobile comms, such information was simply not widely available.

 

I do my best to see the spark of intellect and understanding in what you say and sometimes think I have caught a glimpse.

 

And then you go and spoil it all

By saying something stupid like.........

 

That.

[NigelMoore]

I think it is the cheapest way to be seen to be "doing some of the right things"

 

A large part of the problem though, is that it is a long way from “the cheapest way”. If you look at the statistics, a tiny minority are able to pay the enormously inflated costs of recovering their boats once seized and transported [usually] to the storage places furtherest from their original location.

In the year to August 2014 69 boats were removed from CaRT waters under s.8. Many more will have been removed since July 2012 when they came into being, but the figures have not been divulged [although the number 170 was mooted apparently derived from CaRT sources]. Of those, 57 were supposedly removed following court action because live-aboards.

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/number_of_part_8_civil_procedure#comment-53842

The usual minimum cost of removals using CaRT’s contractors is approximately £5,000.

According to CaRT figures, of these 170 boats, 8 were “disposed of” following the “Torts Act” procedure, presumably sold. Whether the sums recovered by these presumed sales sufficed to cover the costs is not revealed.

By inference, all other un-reclaimed boats were simply destroyed eventually, at yet further cost.

Of all these boats, only 9 were reclaimed by the owners, and only 3 were subsequently re-licensed.

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/request_for_a_breakdown_of_boats#comment-55267

If we then take the total cost of removals in those 2 years, a rough estimation would amount to £850,000 for 170 boat removals [not including storage and any subsequent destruction and disposal costs].

The 9 recovered boats would account – on the same basis – for recovery of £45,000, leaving an outlay of unrecovered sums of approximately £805,000. To be generous, supposing that the 8 boats mentioned as being disposed of by sale were sold for sufficient to cover all costs incurred, then another £40,000 can be detracted, leaving an irrecoverable outlay of £765,000.

As stated, the end result over these two years of such expenditure was only 3 renewed boat licences.

Not “the cheapest way” to enforce boat licensing in my book; while I take the point that fear of seizure will reduce the numbers taking the risk of going unlicensed in the first place – that amounts to over a quarter million per successfully enforced re-licensing.

[Cheshire cat]

I wasn't restricting myself to enforcement. I was thinking it was probably cheaper than dredging a hundred miles or so of canal and it probably gains more brownie points from the ill informed. Win, win!

[NigelMoore]

I wasn't restricting myself to enforcement. I was thinking it was probably cheaper than dredging a hundred miles or so of canal and it probably gains more brownie points from the ill informed. Win, win!

 

I am not going to argue with that.

 

But sticking with the economics as it relates to licence enforcement: I have said that the approximate minimum cost of removal and storage for 6 weeks is around £5,000. The cost of the distances travelled supposedly makes little difference.

By way of comparison, Leigh was billed for roughly £6,500, while in Geoff Mayers case that figure was doubled.

It is also relevant to note that largely by reason of the damage done by allowing his boat to sink, the asking price at one stage, when CaRT put “Pearl” up for sale, was less than £4,000. They would be recovering, in other words, about one third of their outlay is seizing and removing it in the first place.

The economic argument simply does not fly.

The cost of taking s.8 cases to court for rubber stamping approvals of the process in the undefended live-aboard cases, is on average around £1,000. A simple Magistrate’s Court hearing would cost maybe less – certainly if undertaken by CaRT’s own legal staff.

It is notable that even in those s.8 cases, some enlightened few judges have dictated that the boaters should be given the chance to cough up the owed fees and so avoid the inevitability of removal.

On top of the figures arising from successfully carried out s.8 seizures and routine Part 8 procedure cases, there are the costs of legal action in defended cases. These have accounted for costs ranging from around £15,000 to a quarter million per case. On top of that, are the unknown sums that have been forked out in reimbursing those who have had sums criminally extorted from them for licences where not required. That figure [already in the tens of thousands if not having reached six figures] is set to rise exponentially if Leigh wins his case.

Parliament were clearly warned of this in the final House of Lords debate/presentation prior to signing off the Transfer deal, but the Waterways Minister shrugged it off.

Presumably all this expenditure fades into insignificance compared to the annual running budget of some £3 million allocated for licence enforcement. One wonders how much goes towards acquiring new legal staff [ 3 new solicitors were employed recently to add to the existing staff]; certainly, from all accounts, education of enforcement officers has never caught up with requirements, despite earnest promises to the High Court back in 2012.

It is all very well educating boaters in the law - educating relevant CaRT employees would benefit the waterways administration hugely, and not just financially.

Edited November 1, 2016 by NigelMoore

[NigelMoore]

I could also add that nothing hitherto has deterred CaRTs industrious in-house lawyers from extending the licensing bluff even further afield, to rivers where neither licensing not river registration applies.

 

....

 

It is all so unnecessary though. The ultimate stupidity is the failure of the executive to properly appreciate that most boaters are earnestly supportive of this priceless national asset, and are and have been prepared to volunteer huge amounts of time and effort into working towards pragmatic resolutions of some of the real practical problems arising. All that input is now being funnelled into the ever narrowing box-ticking exercises that pass for consultation, and channels of communication become ever more restricted.

 

One of the fundamental principles increasingly urged by the Courts is that every possible avenue should be explored, to avoid taking up court time and yet, that is the one thing that CaRTs legal executive have avoided for years.

 

I have no knowledge at all, of the new replacement for Jackie Lewis, but if debbifiggy is going to forward any more of my posts on to his office could it not include this suggestion: that a face to face meeting to discuss the important issues facing his department would be desirable and hopefully productive?

Edited January 9, 2017 by wrigglefingers
Edited on request by poster

[Arthur Marshall]

 

I do my best to see the spark of intellect and understanding in what you say and sometimes think I have caught a glimpse.

 

And then you go and spoil it all

By saying something stupid like.........

 

That.

Ah. A reasoned argument from pg after all this time. Well done!

[Cheshire cat]

I don't dispute your figures Nigel and I am certainly not saying you are wrong to defend your/our rights.

 

My observation was simply that C&RT might have thought there was a better return to be had by ejecting people from their waterways than can be had by spending the same money on maintenance. As you say, a box ticking exercise.

 

As an aside I notice some dredging has been taking lately on the Trent and Mersey and Staffs and Worcs. Someone must have discovered that particular box too. Long may it continue to exist.

[Tuscan]

"It is all so unnecessary though. The ultimate stupidity is the failure of the executive to properly appreciate that most boaters are earnestly supportive of this priceless national asset, and are and have been prepared to volunteer huge amounts of time and effort into working towards pragmatic resolutions of some of the real practical problems arising. All that input is now being funnelled into the ever narrowing box-ticking exercises that pass for consultation, and channels of communication become ever more restricted."

 

Exactly so Nigel - soon all communication will be channelled through the 'Customer Experience Manager' who was quoted in a recent press release.

[Mike Todd]

 

 

A large part of the problem though, is that it is a long way from “the cheapest way”. If you look at the statistics, a tiny minority are able to pay the enormously inflated costs of recovering their boats once seized and transported [usually] to the storage places furtherest from their original location.

In the year to August 2014 69 boats were removed from CaRT waters under s.8. Many more will have been removed since July 2012 when they came into being, but the figures have not been divulged [although the number 170 was mooted apparently derived from CaRT sources]. Of those, 57 were supposedly removed following court action because live-aboards.

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/number_of_part_8_civil_procedure#comment-53842

The usual minimum cost of removals using CaRT’s contractors is approximately £5,000.

According to CaRT figures, of these 170 boats, 8 were “disposed of” following the “Torts Act” procedure, presumably sold. Whether the sums recovered by these presumed sales sufficed to cover the costs is not revealed.

By inference, all other un-reclaimed boats were simply destroyed eventually, at yet further cost.

Of all these boats, only 9 were reclaimed by the owners, and only 3 were subsequently re-licensed.

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/request_for_a_breakdown_of_boats#comment-55267

If we then take the total cost of removals in those 2 years, a rough estimation would amount to £850,000 for 170 boat removals [not including storage and any subsequent destruction and disposal costs].

The 9 recovered boats would account – on the same basis – for recovery of £45,000, leaving an outlay of unrecovered sums of approximately £805,000. To be generous, supposing that the 8 boats mentioned as being disposed of by sale were sold for sufficient to cover all costs incurred, then another £40,000 can be detracted, leaving an irrecoverable outlay of £765,000.

As stated, the end result over these two years of such expenditure was only 3 renewed boat licences.

Not “the cheapest way” to enforce boat licensing in my book; while I take the point that fear of seizure will reduce the numbers taking the risk of going unlicensed in the first place – that amounts to over a quarter million per successfully enforced re-licensing.

 

Your arithmetic is correct except that (and I thinb that this is what Arthur M has been trying to say) the process you seek to compute is not a closed system. To make a balanced assessment of the process you would need to estimate the effects of not taking the action - what else might have happened in its absence? Whether a deterrent is moral or effective is a big issue - think of nuclear deterrent - but it is usually impossible to do proper experiment!

[NigelMoore]

Your arithmetic is correct except that (and I thinb that this is what Arthur M has been trying to say) the process you seek to compute is not a closed system. To make a balanced assessment of the process you would need to estimate the effects of not taking the action - what else might have happened in its absence? Whether a deterrent is moral or effective is a big issue - think of nuclear deterrent - but it is usually impossible to do proper experiment!

 

I believe that the balanced assessment you speak of would best be achieved, not through a simple comparison between s.8’ing and doing nothing, but between s.8’ing and prosecuting according to the law set out for the purpose.

Such prosecutions would amount to only some 20% of the s.8 removals costs, with Court Orders achieved where enforcement of the sums owed could be left in the hands of the authorised professionals. If the bailiffs chose to seize the boats because of defaulted payments, then that would be their choice and headache – not CaRT’s, and it would be carried out strictly according to law [although as I know, there are a lots of fakes out there who play as fast and loose with the law as CaRT].

The fact is, that even if the boat is to be seized and sold, the multiplication of costs involved in transporting away out of the water is scarcely necessary even then. The Act provides that the boat can be simply secured in place – and it could be sold from the towpath more readily than from some dusty hardstanding.

Just as a matter of interest – CaRT have sometimes used The Sheriff’s Office to carry out boat removals, so it is not as though they do not have the necessary contacts for handing over collection of what would end up as simple CCJ’s.

http://thesheriffsoffice.com/articles/removing-boats-from-waterways

Mr Carter needs to be better informed as to the precise scope of the law on s.8 etc, but is doubtless a conscientious court officer. Whatever opprobrium might fall upon those dealing with the errant boater, will fall on others beside CaRT [who would be one step removed from the process], and so would be vastly preferable in PR terms.

In summary – the comparison between s.8 Removals and Byelaw prosecutions is that one costs a fifth of the other and consumes no CaRT employee time once the court orders are made; one results in lawful enforcement of licence payment by the guilty boater and the other does not; one guarantees continuation of a customer relationship where the other removes the customer altogether, etc, etc.

In both situations, I would have said that the admonitory value was roughly equal.

[NigelMoore]

Nick Brown has made a successful FoI request for the 1965 Fraenkel Report itself – the one directly relevant to Leigh’s case, because it quantifies, with some exactitude, the dimensions of the main navigable channels of canals and rivers as defined in the Transport Act 1968.

 

The details were listed in the dredging date spreadsheet I linked to previously in the now locked thread [Boater sues CRT], but it is nice to have the copies of the original from which those figures were taken. There are 18 different pdf files to download, but the immediately relevant one is –

 

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/366606/response/893624/attach/3/Fraenkel%20Report%20Part%206.pdf

 

 

 

 

edit to change 14 to 18.

Edited November 12, 2016 by NigelMoore

[Mike Todd]

Nick Brown has made a successful FoI request for the 1965 Fraenkel Report itself – the one directly relevant to Leigh’s case, because it quantifies, with some exactitude, the dimensions of the main navigable channels of canals and rivers as defined in the Transport Act 1968.

 

The details were listed in the dredging date spreadsheet I linked to previously in the now locked thread [Boater sues CRT], but it is nice to have the copies of the original from which those figures were taken. There are 14 different pdf files to download, but the immediately relevant one is –

 

https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/366606/response/893624/attach/3/Fraenkel%20Report%20Part%206.pdf

I would have thought that careful thought needs to be given to use of paras 10.5.3 and 10.5.4, albeit that they were originally written in an effort to explain why BW did not have fully to maintain towpaths!

[NigelMoore]

I would have thought that careful thought needs to be given to use of paras 10.5.3 and 10.5.4, albeit that they were originally written in an effort to explain why BW did not have fully to maintain towpaths!

 

Well spotted Mike.

 

It would seem desirable to get hold of the 1973 report on the Leeds & Liverpool Canal, and the Annual Report for 1974.

 

Interesting that Fraenkel mentions that no legal opinion has been sought over definition of the term, despite the clear understanding held by BW in the above quoted documents - and the work Fraenkel himself was undertaking to get the specifications essential to the 1968 definition! A little gratuitous filler I suspect - did they not tell him what they wanted the information for? Perhaps such detail was deemed de minimus given the massive scope of the Report.

 

Paragraph 10.5.3 reads as though he is compiling his report oblivious to the statutory definition his work is designed to accommodate. The expression 'main navigable channel' IS “further defined” by the formula his work is to be used for – and in any case of doubt, the Secretary of State could approve maps drawn up to “further define” the channel if needed!

 

It never WAS needed, and the quoted BW understanding of the term has been unswervingly adhered to ever since [at least, until Leigh's case that is].

 

The thing it is important to recognise with the relevant sections of the 1968 Transport Act, is that it was designed to limit BW's exposure to High Court action under s.106, as much as to impose minimal obligation standards. The necessity for precision as to what BW could be held accountable in law for, was very much a driving force behind the exact formula provided under the Act.

 

The other important point to take away from the background information supplied here, is that BW evidently demonstrated, a scant 2 years after drafting the 1971 Act, what their clear understanding was, of the term they had used in that Act! It has to be remembered that the 1971 Act was a privately promoted Act drafted by themselves according to what they understood by the terms employed in the prior public Act of a few years previous.

 

The information revealed in Fraenkel's Report conclusively establishes that BW considered the relevant term they employed in 1971 on the back of the 1968 Transport Act, to have the identical meaning to how they used it in their Byelaws a few years earlier than the Transport Act [Fraenkel's head-scratching notwithstanding].

[NigelMoore]

It is rather fascinating to read Fraenkel’s exploration of the limits to which the ambiguity [as he saw it] of the phrase “main navigable channel” could be extended. While doing so, the judicial dictum has to be borne in mind - that where ambiguity exists within a private Act [which the 1971 Act is], that interpretation should be applied that best serves the interest of the public against the interests of the Act’s promoters.

 

Even so, the variations respecting application of the 1968 formula to the dredging requisites of the Act are genuinely interesting. I need to read the section in depth paying more attention and giving it more thought, but the immediate impact of his ideas, especially where illustrated by cross-sections of the watercourse, are unmistakeable.

 

In general, he considers that theoretically, the channel that ought to be maintained should be roughly 3 and a bit times the width of vessel of the applicable category [even while recognising that that would in some instances, extend beyond the built widths of some canals to begin with!]

 

The minimum width of course, would be double the vessel width plus a few inches spare – but he takes into consideration that differences in width might be required between the bed width and the surface width. This minimal dimension is what BW ran with, as used by CaRT today.

 

A variation that would reduce the width even further, however, was interesting, in that he postulated the possibility that [e.g. for commercial waterways] only a single commercial vessel would need passage in one direction, and that the definition might be met if the dredged depth accommodated that, plus a shallower depth alongside sufficient for lesser-draughted vessels. Personally, I think that would be wrong; what that describes to my mind is a main navigable channel of the narrowest possible dimension, with a secondary navigable channel immediately alongside. It does not allow either, for coping with 2 larger vessels travelling in opposite directions – but as I said, the exploration of the limits is of interest.

The other fascinating aspect to this section of the Fraenkel Report is that it shows BW in opposition to somebody using CaRT’s present argument against their own interpretation!

[Mike Todd]

It is rather fascinating to read Fraenkel’s exploration of the limits to which the ambiguity [as he saw it] of the phrase “main navigable channel” could be extended. While doing so, the judicial dictum has to be borne in mind - that where ambiguity exists within a private Act [which the 1971 Act is], that interpretation should be applied that best serves the interest of the public against the interests of the Act’s promoters.

 

Even so, the variations respecting application of the 1968 formula to the dredging requisites of the Act are genuinely interesting. I need to read the section in depth paying more attention and giving it more thought, but the immediate impact of his ideas, especially where illustrated by cross-sections of the watercourse, are unmistakeable.

 

In general, he considers that theoretically, the channel that ought to be maintained should be roughly 3 and a bit times the width of vessel of the applicable category [even while recognising that that would in some instances, extend beyond the built widths of some canals to begin with!]

 

The minimum width of course, would be double the vessel width plus a few inches spare – but he takes into consideration that differences in width might be required between the bed width and the surface width. This minimal dimension is what BW ran with, as used by CaRT today.

 

A variation that would reduce the width even further, however, was interesting, in that he postulated the possibility that [e.g. for commercial waterways] only a single commercial vessel would need passage in one direction, and that the definition might be met if the dredged depth accommodated that, plus a shallower depth alongside sufficient for lesser-draughted vessels. Personally, I think that would be wrong; what that describes to my mind is a main navigable channel of the narrowest possible dimension, with a secondary navigable channel immediately alongside. It does not allow either, for coping with 2 larger vessels travelling in opposite directions – but as I said, the exploration of the limits is of interest.

The other fascinating aspect to this section of the Fraenkel Report is that it shows BW in opposition to somebody using CaRT’s present argument against their own interpretation!

Are you making the assumption that there is an equivalence between 'main navigation channel' (MNC) and the section to be dredged?

 

Section 10 (and I admit not to having read the other pdf's as yet) does accept that the MNC is sometimes constructed with sloping edges so that at the extreme of the MNC then it is not actually navigable in the sense that a boat can continuously move along it. Fraenkel does not propose dredging the whole channel out to the towpath of equivalent edges, even though they are considered part of the MNC.

 

Have you also given thought to the significance of 'main' in the phrase MNC? Unless it is tautological, then there have to be non-main navigable channels. I'm not sure how they might fit into the argument (from any perspective).

[NigelMoore]

Are you making the assumption that there is an equivalence between 'main navigation channel' (MNC) and the section to be dredged?

 

Section 10 (and I admit not to having read the other pdf's as yet) does accept that the MNC is sometimes constructed with sloping edges so that at the extreme of the MNC then it is not actually navigable in the sense that a boat can continuously move along it. Fraenkel does not propose dredging the whole channel out to the towpath of equivalent edges, even though they are considered part of the MNC.

 

Have you also given thought to the significance of 'main' in the phrase MNC? Unless it is tautological, then there have to be non-main navigable channels. I'm not sure how they might fit into the argument (from any perspective).

 

Essentially, yes – understanding that the maintenance requirements will be inevitably greater than the dredging requirements, in order to maintain the minimum main navigable channel. That is the channel that can be used by the appropriate shipping. The width of surface water above the dredged bed can be greater than that of course, and the treatment of the banks will entail variance in the overall width of waterway [depending whether the bed is gradually sloped or steel piled], but no matter how wide that might be considered to be, the channel usable by the specified craft will be limited to that which is directly above the bed.

 

The effect of this is that the width of water - navigable by alternative, shallow drafted vessels - will be in some instances far wider than the “minimum operational channel” [which is the designation BW/CaRT have used as their modern alternative], but the main navigable channel itself remains that which is navigable by craft of the statutory criteria. That is why it is the MAIN navigable channel, with the water either side being navigable channels, but only usable by smaller craft.

 

The maintenance obligation might well extend beyond the geographic limits of the main navigable channel, as Fraenkel argues: maintenance of the adjacent areas could well be essential to maintaining the central channel [though including towpaths is stretching it a bit] – but that channel is still what is described in the 1968 Act.

 

This does lead to some further points of interest raised by Fraenkel; he considers, as I noted earlier, that the width of the channel at surface water level should be greater than the width of the dredged depth at bed level, in order to allow for hydrological action between fast moving, heavy laden vessels.

 

He claims that sufficient space to allow 2 boats to pass each other with minimal resistance, necessitates that the water level width “should be considerably more than twice the beam of the vessel in order that the cross sectional area of the waterway may be large enough in relation to the immersed cross sectional area of the vessel.”

 

He then elaborates on the ratio of cross-sectional areas of immersed vessel to waterway, the terms of which I am at present uncertain as to meaning. It seems at first flush that this is a little different from comparing widths. The ratio of those cross-sectional areas he says “should preferably be 5:1, normally at least 4:1 and only at bridges, aqueducts, etc, should it ever be less than 3½:1.”

 

However, he states in para.10.3.9 that “In applying the above standards it has been borne in mind that many of the waterways were constructed . . . for specific craft. There are some cases where to provide a channel width to allow two Table 10.1 craft to pass would involve widening the canal beyond its original or improved dimensions. It is considered that such a widening would not be covered by Section 105(2) of the Transport Act 1968.” [my bold]

 

That has to be, very obviously, correct. I presume, for present purposes, that he is referring to the application of the formula incorporating his hydrological optimums. If so, then that formula cannot be that which is envisaged in the Transport Act!

 

He consequently concludes, in para.10.3.17 that “We have, therefore, arrived at the required profile for each waterway by applying the above considerations, i.e. paragraphs 10.3.3 and 10.3.8, to the Table 10.1 craft . . . in the first instance. If this would involve widening works, as mentioned in paragraph 10.3.9, then a profile has been adopted which allows free passage of one Table 10.1 craft within the channel, and also allows group cruising craft of lesser draught ( a ) to pass each other and ( b ) to pass the Table 10.1 craft everywhere (except at locks, bridges and similar local restrictions).”

 

It boils down to the profile charts that follow. The "bed width" is the main navigable channel; the "waterway width" is the whole navigable channel. It is a pity that he has not specified the “passing distance” as a definitive ratio, but scaling from the sketch it seems as though he is operating on a ratio of passing distance to beam of Table 10.1 vessel, of approximately one half. So the dredging width has to be 2.5 times the width of specified vessel.

 

 

This seems far more generous than the specifications adopted by BW and continued in the CaRT dredging specs, but that is hardly surprising.

 

Insofar as this debate has relevance to the Ravenscroft claim, even the most extreme formula postulated by Fraenkel would not affect it adversely.

 

The BW width figure for craft dimensions on the Trent during 1967, Nottingham to Cromwell = 5.72mtrs [as listed in Table 10.1 on page 130 of the Report].

 

Therefore, even allowing for double the Fraenkel passing distance, the maximum width of the main navigable channel will be 17.16mtrs [56.3 feet]. Interestingly, that is 2.7 feet less than the designated navigable channel under the 1906 Trent Navigation Act, which specified a channel of 60 foot width at 5 foot depth.

 

The actual width of the river at Farndon is 56mtrs; triple the width of the main navigable channel, whether as specified by the 1906 Act, or whether applying an exaggerated Fraenkel formula to the 1968 Act.

 

Just to add an addendum – there is a clear difference in the legislation between “River Waterways” and “Inland Waterways”. The former is defined as constituting the ‘main navigable channel’; the latter is defined as constituting ALL the works and infrastructure designed to support the former. Exactly the same definitions apply to “Commercial Waterways” and “Cruising Waterways”; each of those comprise ONLY the ‘main navigable channel’ of the relevant “Inland Waterway”.

[NigelMoore]

By way of comparison with the above calculations, the Minimum Operational Channel that CaRT have worked to on the relevant stretch of the River Trent, is LESS the twice the Fraenkel Beam as recorded in his Table 10.1.

CaRT’s Excel spreadsheet of MOC dimensions show that the standard to which they have been working between 1998 and 2006 – relating to this section of the Trent - has been a bed width of just 36 feet [11mtrs at 2mtrs depth].


www.britishwaterways.co.uk/media/documents/meetings/wusig/MOC-dimensions-comparison-v3-110311.xls


I was wondering when I first looked at this, whether a greater depth would have justified the narrower section, but the Fraenkel dredge-depth calculation for here is for an optimum 2.38mtrs, with a minimum of 2.13mtrs.

So CaRT’s “main navigable channel” is less than that which the 1968 Act demands. Using the craft dimensions supplied to Fraenkel by BW, the minimum width of the main navigable channel ought to be around 47 feet [14.3mtrs]

[NigelMoore]

Another aspect to the s.8 costs - check out the Report of Denise Yelland on 2012/13 Targets. She quotes the over-riding CaRT objective/”main CRT strategy” as being “To grow CRT’s net income from all sources . . .”, and goes on to consider licence enforcement, amongst other topics, in light of that. She actually states that now that they are much clearer on what is needed, it will be easier “to give contractors the confidence in investing in this opportunity.”

 

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=13dea7522320519d&mt=application/pdf&url=https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui%3D2%26ik%3D4b007f8b46%26view%3Datt%26th%3D13dea7522320519d%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dsafe%26zw&sig=AHIEtbSNXSfFNgjqkGhk7o-BJdlsDoGbYQ

 

As I said in a Report to the GLA: “there is an element of something extremely distasteful in the promotion of the exercise of such powers as an investment opportunity!”

 

Obviously, Commercial Boat Services were one of the companies who saw the investment opportunity in s.8 procedures, and Leigh’s case was simply an example of the profitability of their contract.

 

The target back in 2012 to 2013 was for 60-70 non-compliant boats to be removed over the period; figures for the latter third of that period were later given as 24, which was firmly on target.

 

http://www.canaljunction.com/news/twenty-four-unlicensed-boats-removed-crt/1369

 

[i note that this article also, confirms CaRT’s refusal to put the boat back in the water unless outstanding fees were paid, additionally to the quoted removal costs of “almost £5,500” despite the recent admission that they are not entitled to do so.]

 

Also familiar from Leigh’s scenario, is that the full quoted estimate of the contractors was paid, in order to keep the boat in the water, even though though they had not even lifted it out at that stage! It does rather look as though this £5,500 is a standardised fee, regardless of size of vessel or circumstances [although the removal costs for ‘Pearl’ were double that.] Obviously, it would seem, CaRT have given guarantees to the contractors that once given the job, they will be paid if full regardless of whether they have to carry the job out or not.

 

That grossly unfair imposition on the boat owner is something Leigh will have to highlight in cross-examination next year. The article above is also an additional bit of evidence to discredit Mr Stoner QC's argument that demanding Leigh's payment for the alleged arrears of 'licence' fees was simply a "mistake" and purely "inadvertent". It obviously was nothing of the kind - instead, it has been a stated objective of CaRT from their inception [as the "License it or Lose it" web pages asserted from the same date and beyond - until, in fact, the relevant statement was removed after someone pointed out CaRT's admissions in Leigh's case].

[Teasel]

Another thing is that the Terms and Conditions to the licence they are trying to sell to make 'lawful' what was an 'unlawful' mooring specifically state that the relevant licence cannot perform this function. It's at 3.3 on p2 I think.

 

There's a remedy in s5 BW Act 1983 for the non-payment of fees set out under s43(3) of the Transport Act 1962 - that's the one I think they need to use.

 

These might have already been pointed out a few times by now i'd say - i'm new here (hi).

[Naughty Cal]

Good afternoon Dunkley.

[NigelMoore]

From the Waterways Ombudsman Report, 2010 to 2011:-

 

“1. Mr L moors his boat on a river waterway at the bottom of his garden. He believes that, as he has riparian rights, no licence is required during the winter when the boat remains stationary at the mooring. British Waterways accepted that he did not require a mooring permit but argued to him that, in accordance with Section 5 of the British Waterways Act 1971, he still required a licence to keep the boat on the waterway. They accepted that that Section only applied to the main navigable channel of the waterway, but said that they interpreted ‘main navigable channel’ as referring to the whole width of the waterway.

 

2. I pointed out that that interpretation of ‘main navigable channel’ was not the one British Waterways had applied previously when dealing with complaints about lack of maintenance under moorings. Then they had argued that, as their maintenance obligations in the Transport Act 1968 applied only to the main navigable channel, they were not obliged to dredge under moorings, only the central part of the waterway. British Waterways accepted that my comments were valid. However rather than as previously relying on Section 5 of the 1971 Act, they now referred to Section 13 of that Act, which includes a requirement for houseboats kept on ‘inland waterways’ to have houseboat certificates.”

 

The following case she dealt with, also dealt with a dredging complaint, and BW maintained their interpretation along the lines of their previous understanding that their obligation regarding this was restricted to "the central part of the waterway".

 

No wonder they keep falling back onto the "houseboat" classification; I can see a time when they will try discarding all PBL's in favour of cc'ing houseboat certificates as per the Wingfield argument.